On 25th May 2020 during his live televised press conference, the Senior Government Advisor Dominic Cummings stated that “Last year I wrote about the possible threat of coronaviruses and the urgent need for planning.”
His blog website is contained at the address https://dominiccummings.com/.
One of those blog pages contains reference to ‘coronavirus’ which is available here.
However, the reference to ‘coronavirus’ was not included during 2019 as stated, in fact it was only added in April 2020 and this investigation considers and provides the evidence available to identify when it was actually added.
The Version of the Blog Page – 9th April 2020
The Archive.org website contains a version of this same blog page that are dated between 31st March 2019 and 26th May 2020.
The version dated 9th April 2020 is available here. The comparable paragraphs from that version of the blog to those provided above are as follows:
‘But the high percentage of human error reported here calls into question claims that state-of-the-art design of BSL3, BSL3+ (augmented BSL3), and BSL4 labs will prevent the release of dangerous pathogens. How much lab-worker training might reduce human error and undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections remains an open question. Given the many ways by which human error can occur, it is doubtful that Fouchier’s human-error-prevention measures can eliminate release of airborne-transmissible avian flu into the community through undetected or unreported lab infections…
‘In its 2016 study for the NIH, “Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research,” Gryphon Scientific looked to the transportation, chemical, and nuclear sectors to define types of human error and their probabilities. As Gryphon summarized in its findings, the three types of human error are skill-based (errors involving motor skills involving little thought), rule-based (errors in following instructions or set procedures accidentally or purposely), and knowledge-based (errors stemming from a lack of knowledge or a wrong judgment call based on lack of experience). Gryphon claimed that “no comprehensive Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) study has yet been completed for a biological laboratory… . This lack of data required finding suitable proxies for accidents in other fields.”
‘But mandatory incident reporting to FSAP and NIH actually does provide sufficient data to quantify human error in BSL3 biocontainment labs…
[An example] A fourth release in 2014 from the CDC labs occurred when “Scientists inadvertently switched samples designated for live Ebola virus studies with samples intended for studies with inactivated material. As a result, the samples with viable Ebola virus, instead of the samples with inactivated Ebola virus, were transferred out of a BSL-4 laboratory to a laboratory with a lower safety level for additional analysis. While no one contracted Ebola virus in this instance, the consequences could have been dire for the personnel involved as there are currently no approved treatments or vaccines for this virus.”…
‘ In an analysis circulated at the 2017 meeting for the Biological Weapons Convention, a conservative estimate shows that the probability is about 20 percent for a release of a mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into the community from at least one of 10 labs over a 10-year period of developing and researching this type of pathogen… Analysis of the FOIA NIH data gives a much higher release probability — that is, a factor five to 10 times higher…
‘The avian flu virus H5N1 kills 60 percent of people who become infected from direct contact with infected birds. The mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza created in the Fouchier and Kawaoka labs should be able to infect humans through the air, and the viruses could be deadly.
The Current Blog – 3rd May 2020
On 26th May 2020 the active/current blog page is available at the address: https://dominiccummings.com/2019/03/04/the-most-secure-bio-labs-routinely-make-errors-that-could-cause-a-global-pandemic-are-about-to-re-start-experiments-on-pathogens-engineered-to-make-them-mammalian-airborne-transmissible/ and includes a section that contains reference to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus.
This paragraph first appear as below:
‘But the high percentage of human error reported here calls into question claims that state-of-the-art design of BSL3, BSL3+ (augmented BSL3), and BSL4 labs will prevent the release of dangerous pathogens. How much lab-worker training might reduce human error and undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections remains an open question. Given the many ways by which human error can occur, it is doubtful that Fouchier’s human-error-prevention measures can eliminate release of airborne-transmissible avian flu into the community through undetected or unreported lab infections…
‘In its 2016 study for the NIH, “Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research,” Gryphon Scientific looked to the transportation, chemical, and nuclear sectors to define types of human error and their probabilities. As Gryphon summarized in its findings, the three types of human error are skill-based (errors involving motor skills involving little thought), rule-based (errors in following instructions or set procedures accidentally or purposely), and knowledge-based (errors stemming from a lack of knowledge or a wrong judgment call based on lack of experience). Gryphon claimed that “no comprehensive Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) study has yet been completed for a biological laboratory… . This lack of data required finding suitable proxies for accidents in other fields.”
‘But mandatory incident reporting to FSAP and NIH actually does provide sufficient data to quantify human error in BSL3 biocontainment labs…
‘Among other things, the GAO report called attention to a well-publicized incident in which a Defense Department laboratory “inadvertently sent live Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax, to almost 200 laboratories worldwide over the course of 12 years. The laboratory believed that the samples had been inactivated.” The report describes yet another well-publicized incident in China in which “two researchers conducting virus research were exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus samples that were incompletely inactivated. The researchers subsequently transmitted SARS to others, leading to several infections and one death in 2004.”
‘The GAO identified three recent releases of Ebola and Marburg viruses from BSL4 to lower containment labs due to incomplete inactivation.
‘A fourth release in 2014 from the CDC labs occurred when “Scientists inadvertently switched samples designated for live Ebola virus studies with samples intended for studies with inactivated material. As a result, the samples with viable Ebola virus, instead of the samples with inactivated Ebola virus, were transferred out of a BSL-4 laboratory to a laboratory with a lower safety level for additional analysis. While no one contracted Ebola virus in this instance, the consequences could have been dire for the personnel involved as there are currently no approved treatments or vaccines for this virus.”…
‘ In an analysis circulated at the 2017 meeting for the Biological Weapons Convention, a conservative estimate shows that the probability is about 20 percent for a release of a mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into the community from at least one of 10 labs over a 10-year period of developing and researching this type of pathogen… Analysis of the FOIA NIH data gives a much higher release probability — that is, a factor five to 10 times higher…
‘The avian flu virus H5N1 kills 60 percent of people who become infected from direct contact with infected birds. The mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza created in the Fouchier and Kawaoka labs should be able to infect humans through the air, and the viruses could be deadly.
What is Missing from 9th April that Appears on 3rd May 2020?
The following 2 paragraphs are missing from the blog dated 9th April 2020 but appear in the page that was stored by Archive.org on 3rd May 2020:
‘Among other things, the GAO report called attention to a well-publicized incident in which a Defense Department laboratory “inadvertently sent live Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax, to almost 200 laboratories worldwide over the course of 12 years. The laboratory believed that the samples had been inactivated.” The report describes yet another well-publicized incident in China in which “two researchers conducting virus research were exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus samples that were incompletely inactivated. The researchers subsequently transmitted SARS to others, leading to several infections and one death in 2004.”
‘The GAO identified three recent releases of Ebola and Marburg viruses from BSL4 to lower containment labs due to incomplete inactivation.
Therefore, the paragraph referring to “severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus” were added between 9th April 2020 and 3rd May 2020. Those paragraphs were not in the original article or any stored by the Archive.org website until the one stored on 3rd May 2020.
When was the Blog Page Actually Changed?
As normal with a website, the one containing the Blog includes a sitemap file. This sitemap file is available here.
The site map is mainly used by search engines to identify the pages within a website and allow them to identify any updates since their last visit/crawl.
The sitemap also normally includes a ‘last edit’ time/date stamp for each of the pages so that new content can be easily found.
Within https://dominiccummings.com/sitemap.xml, the blog page at the site address the-most-secure-bio-labs-routinely-make-errors-that-could-cause-a-global-pandemic-are-about-to-re-start-experiments-on-pathogens-engineered-to-make-them-mammalian-airborne-transmissible/ is listed as follows:
<url><loc>https://dominiccummings.com/2019/03/04/the-most-secure-bio-labs-routinely-make-errors-that-could-cause-a-global-pandemic-are-about-to-re-start-experiments-on-pathogens-engineered-to-make-them-mammalian-airborne-transmissible/</loc><mobile:mobile/><lastmod>2020-04-14T20:55:20+00:00</lastmod><changefreq>monthly</changefreq></url>
This entry indicates that the time of last edit of the blog page was at 20:55:20 hrs (+00:00 UTC, 21:55 hrs BST) on 14th April 2020.
The difference between the blog page on 9th April 2020 and 3rd May 2020 was the addition of the 2 paragraphs relating to ‘coronavirus’ and the content of the sitemap confirms that those 2 paragraphs had been added to that page at 21:55 hrs (BST) on 14th April 2020.
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